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v	 Objective
Describe the NASA Human Research
Program Risk Assessment and Integration
Team's approach to utilizing Probabilistic
Risk Assessment techniques in providing
risk management information to its
customers.
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F
	 Outline
Section 1
—Approach in utilizing a qualitative risk
assessment to provide risk management
information.
• Section 2
— Future utilization of quantitative risk
assessment towards the development of risk
mitigation strategies.
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Human Research
Program Goal
• From Section 1.1 of Human Reasearch
Program's Program Plan dated June 1, 2006
— "The Human Research Program (HRP) was
formed in September 2005 at the Johnson Space
Center (JSC) in response to NASA's decision to
move human research program management
from Headquarters Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD) to JSC and to focus its
research investment on investiqatinq and
mite atin the h^qhest risks to astronaut health
and performance in support of exploration
missions."
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Section 1
UTILIZING A QUALITATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT TO PROVIDE RISK
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
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"WW Focusing ResearchA  I	
Investment
Presumably, HRP will decide how to
"focus research investment" based on the
following criteria:
— Risk Criticality*
— Risk Priority*
*Human Research Program Integrated Research Plan, Revision A,
January 2009 (I RP)
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	 Criticality
0 "Programmatic" Criticality
—WHAT tasks are necessary to fill knowledge
gaps
—WHEN those tasks will be accomplished
—WHERE the tasks will be accomplished
—WHO will accomplish these tasks
—WHAT results are being produced by task
accomplishment
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	 Criticality
• "Operational Criticality"*
— "The degree to which the risk would cause a vote
of `no-go' for undertaking a mission." (Kundrot)
— Three levels of Operational Criticality
• Critical to quantify or reduce prior to the Lunar Outpost
or Mars Missions
• Important to quantify and reduce prior to the Lunar
Outpost or Mars Missions
Desirable to quantify and reduce prior to the Lunar
Outpost or Mars Missions
*NOTE: "Operational" Criticality is not an industry standard term. It only has relevance within the context of RAIT's analyses.
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	 Criticality
• Operational Criticality and Programmatic Criticality
work together.
— "Ultimately, assessment of the criticality is based on
the likelihood and conse quence of the risks,
• the pa ps, and
• the tasks,
• coupled with the uncertaint y in risk projections.
Assessment involves integration and comparison of
risk factors and the impact each task may have on the
reduction of the overall risk to the mission or the crew,
given different mission scenarios, research
approaches, and outcomes." (IRP, Jan. 2009)
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	 Priority
• "The criticality of a risk for either a Lunar or a Mars
mission alone is not sufficient to determine the
optimum level of activity (or budget) or timing for
research investments.
• Other factors combine to determine the research
approach, such as
— limited availability (of certain necessary resources like the
Space Shuttle and the ISS),
— exceptionally long lead times (needed to improve
understanding and mitigation of radiation risks), or
—the amount of risk reduction that can be obtained with a
specific set of resources." (IRP, Jan. 2009)
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	 Priority
The Risk Management and Assessment
Tool (RMAT) is [eventually] intended "...to
categorize and document the assessment
of the risks and to document [risk] priority."
(IRP, Jan. 2009)
• NOTE: Priority assessment not addressed
in this presentation.
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v	 Assessing Criticality
RAIT's current focus is to provide HRP
with risk management information utilizing
Operational Criticality as a cornerstone.
— Programmatic Criticality not currently being
addressed by RAIT.
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	 Assessing Criticality
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Create PIN T 	Combine Files
u r	 ^L 0	 68 f
'Excerpt from HRP Program Plan, Risk Management Plan Section
Basektie
Table E- C'onsequei Criteria illatrix for Assessment of 	 Risks
4 Wk.
F
	 Assessing Criticality
• Operational Criticality (Safety and Technical
Risk) concerns:
— Astronaut health and safety during a mission
(Short Term Health (STH))
—Accomplishing mission objectives (In Mission
Performance (IMP))
— Astronaut health and safety after a mission (Long
Term Health (LTH))
14
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	 Assessing Criticality
Safety and Technical Risk — Consequence Definitions
Classification Consequence Criteria
Short Term Health In-Mission Performance Long Term Health
5 Very High Death (LOC) or in-mission Contingency Abort (LOM) Permanently disabling injury or
disabling injury illness, unable to correct or
compensate; premature death
4 High Injury, illness, incapacitation Failure	 to	 achieve	 major Disability or occupational illness,
or impairment, could be mission objectives partially corrected, partially
serious enough to lead to compensate
evacuation
3 Moderate Injury, illness or Moderate impact to operations, Disability or occupational illness,
incapacitation, may affect workarounds available partially corrected, able to
personal safety or health compensate
2 Low Injury requiring treatment, Minor	 impact	 to	 operations, Disability or occupational illness,
does not affect personal workarounds available can be corrected with terrestrial
safety or health advances in treatment and/or
surgery to approximate pre-flight
condition
1 Very Low Injury not requiring treatment Negligible	 impact	 to	 mission Disability is short term
operations/objectives
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Assessing Criticality
• Question 1:
— How can we provide a qualitiative assessment of a
risk topic's safety and technical risk profile?
• Question 2:
—What decision rules will be used to correlate the
qualitative assessment with the three Operational
Criticality categories (Critical, Important, Desirable)?
• Question 3:
— How do we display the Operational Criticality status of
all H RP risks at once?
16
F	 Assessing Criticality —
Question 1
In order to determine a risk topic's safety
and technical risk profile, HRP must
include the following considerations
— Consequence that the risk may cause,
— Likelihood that the risk may cause the
corresponding Consequence, and
— Severity of the risk
• A 5x5 matrix can be used to qualitiatively
provide this information.
	 17
_	 Assessing Criticality
Question 1
• LxC Mapping Guidelines
— Identify the adverse outcome from the risk topic's risk statement
given the currently available mitigation strategies.
• In all risk statements, the adverse outcome should be the reasonable
and immediate outcome(s) of the risk event (i.e. the event we would like
to prevent).
— Determine what the adverse outcome's consequence level (i.e.
level 5, 4 ) 3 1 2, 1) is for each consequence category (STH, IMPLTH)
At present, we are asking for the most reasonable and immediate
consequence that their adverse outcome represents. In general
however, a set of rules and assumptions needs to be developed and
cleary stated in order to enable discipline area scientists to map their
risk's adverse outcome to a particular consequence level.
— Estimate the likelihood range (i.e. range 5, 4 1 3 1 2 1 1) for each
risk topic's adverse outcome
— Provide this mapping for each mission profie (Lunar, and Mars)$
Assessing Criticality —
Question 1
• LxC Mapping Guidelines
— Example Risk Statements
• Risk of Adverse Behavioral Conditions
— Given the extended duration of future missions and the isolated,
extreme and confined environments, there is a possibility that
adverse behavioral conditions will occur.
• Risk of Bone Fracture
— Given that crewmembers may experience high impact forces
and/or decrease in bone strength, there is the possibility that
fracture may occur.
• Risk of Radiation Carcinogenesis
— Given that crewmembers are exposed to radiation from the space
environment, there is a possibility for increased cancer morbidity or
mortality.
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Assessing Criticality —
Question 1
• LxC Mapping Guidelines
— Example Risk Statements
• Risk of Crew Adverse Health Event Due To Altered Immune
Response
— Given that the spaceflight environment results in an alteration of the
immune system there is a possibility that the crew will have an
increased susceptibility to certain disease states.
• Risk of Cardiac Rhythm Problems
— Given the condition of microgravity, there is a possibility that cardiac
rhythm disturbances may occur.
• Risk of Reduced Safety and Efficiency Due to Inadequately
Designed Vehicle, Environment, Tools or Equipment
— Given the condition of poor human factors design of physical and
cognitive work environments, there is a possibility of ineffective or
inefficient crew performance.
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li^	 Assessing Criticality —
Question 1
• LxC Mapping Examples
— Bone Fracture Risk Topic
• The adverse event, as stated in the risk statement is
"fracture".
• Assume this fits in consequence level 4 (for the
currently available mitigation strategies).
— "Injury, illness, incapacitation or impairment, could be
serious enough to lead to evacuation"
• Assume the estimate for the likelihood of "fracture" for a
Lunar mission is in the Very Low likelihood range.
21
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Assessing Criticality —Question 1
Lunar Mission STH LxC Mapping for Fracture
Likelihood Range
5 >10%
Very High
4 1%-10% 
High
3 0.1%_1%
Moderate
Z 0.01%-0.1%
Low
1 <0.01%
Very Low
Conse uenceq t, 3
a
High Very HighV erg Low Low Moderate
-Example of Bone Fracture Mapping
-Consequence Level: 4
-Likelihood Range: 1
Fracture
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1^	 Assessing Criticality —
Question 1
• LxC Mapping Examples
— Cardiac Rhythm Problems
• The adverse event as stated in the risk statment is "cardiac
rhythm disturbances".
• Assume this fits in consequence level 5 (for the currently
available mitigation strategies)
— "Death (LOC) or in-mission disabling injury"
» Although not explicitly stated as such, we assume that
"cardiac rhythm disturbances" means a heart attack. If simply
means rhythm fluctuations rather, the consequence would not
be level 5; perhaps level 3.
• Assume the estimate for the likelihood of "cardiac rhythm
disturbances" for a Lunar mission is in the Moderate
likelihood range.
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Question 1
Lunar Mission STH LxC Mapping for Disrythmia
Likelihood Range
5 >10%
Vert' High
4 1%-10% 
High
3 0.1%_1%
Moderate
Z 0.01%-0.1%
Low
1 <0.01%
Very Low
Consequenceq ,
3 aHigh Very High
 err Low Low Moderate
-Example of Cardiac Rhythm Problems Mapping
-Consequence Level: 5
-Likelihood Range: 3
Disrhythmia
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Assessing Criticality —
Key Points
• In order to utilize LxC mapping on a 5x5 matrix in
a tenable manner, the following needs to occur
— Explicit identification of the adverse outcome
described in each risk statement
— Confirmation by discipline area scientists on which
consequence level (for each of STHH, IMP, & LTH)
their adverse outcome represents
• Requires a clearly stated set of rules and assumptions
— Decision on what likelihood range represents a
reasonable probability of occurrence of their adverse
outcome for each mission profile (Lunar, Mars)
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Assessing Criticality —
Incorporating Severity
• Severity — "intensity or sharpness, as of cold
or pain" (www. d i cti o n a ry. co m)
• Severity is a subjective measure of the
overall level of detriment posed by a risk.
• Severity
matrix.
is inherently depicted in a 5x5
See explanation of derivation of 5x5 matrix in
Appendix B of APR 8000.4
26
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Assessing Criticality —
Incorporating Severity
Likelihood Range
5 >10%
Very High
a 1 %-10%
High
3 0.1 %_1%
Moderato
0.01 %-0.1 %
Low
1 <0.01 %
Very Low
Consequence 1Very Low
2
Low
3
yloderate
4
High
5
Very High
-The Severity level of a risk is determined by resultant
mapping it's LxC scoring produces.
-Severity Classification:
-High — Red
-Medium — Yellow
-Low — Green	 27
Assessing Criticality —
Question 2
• Decision Rules on Operational Criticality
Scoring
— Map Severity ranking directly to Operational
Criticality ranking
• Critical = High Severity
• Important = Medium Severity
• Desireable = Low Severity
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Assessing Criticality —
Question 2
• Decision Rules on Operational Criticality Scoring
— If a risk's LxC scoring identifies it's potential impact as
"High Severity", then
• it is "Critical to quantify or reduce [the risk] prior to the Lunar
Outpost or Mars Missions" .
— If a risk's LxC scoring identifies it's potential impact as
"Medium Severity", then
• it is "Important to quantify and reduce [the risk] prior to the Lunar
Outpost or Mars Missions".
— If a risk's LxC scoring identifies it's potential impact as
"Low Severity", then
• it is "Desirable to quantify and reduce [the risk prior to the Lunar
Outpost or Mars Missions".
29
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Assessing Criticality —Question 2
Likelihood Range
5 >10%
Very High
4 1%-10%
High
3 0.1%_1%
Moderato
2 0.01%-0.1%
Low
1 <0.01% /o
Very Low
Consequence 1Very Low
2
Low
3
yloderate
4
High
S
Very High
-Operational Criticality now linked to outcome of
qualitiative assessment of risks using 5x5 matrix.
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Assessing Criticality —
Question 3
ie result of qualitative
of Operational Criticality
"portfolio" of 27 risks.
• Displaying tI
assessment
— HRP has a
—All risks have a research team hoping to receive
funding.
— HRP customers (NASA Space and Life Sciences
Directorate and Office of the Chief Medical Officer(OCHMO)) needs a "snapshot" of Operational
Criticality in order to help with program
management decisions.
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Assessing Criticality —
Question 3
• Operational Criticality Display
Development
1. Aggregate all 5x5 matrices into an
Operational Criticality Table (OCT).
2. Prepare a weighted Operational Criticality
Score (OCS) for each risk.
3. Plot all OCS scores.
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Assessing Criticality —
Question 3
1. Operational Criticality Table*
Risk/Risk Factor of:
Lunar Consequences
STH	 IMP	 LTH
Martian Consequences
STH2	 IMP2	 LTH2
Acute or Late Central Nervous System Effects from Radiation Exposure I I I C C C
Inability to Adequately Treat an III or Injured Crew Member I I D C C D
Behavioral and Psychiatric Conditions D D D C C D
Inadequate Nutrition D D D C C D
Inadequate Food System D D D C C D
Radiation Carcino enesis D D C D D C
Reduced Physical Performance Capabilities Due to Reduced Aerobic Capacity D I D D C D
Impaired Performance Due to Reduced Muscle Mass, Strength and Endurance D I D D C D
Degenerative Tissue or other Health Effects from Radiation Exposure D D I D D C
Acute Radiation Syndromes Due to Solar Particle Events I I D I I D
Compromised EVA Performance and Crew Health Due to Inadequate EVA Suit Systems D I D I I D
Intervertebral Disc Damage D D D I I D
Cardiac Rhythm Problems D D D I I D
Orthostatic Intolerance During Re-Exposure to Gravity D D D I I D
Crew Adverse Health Event Due To Altered Immune Response D D D I I D
Therapeutic Failure Due to Ineffectiveness of Medication D D D I I D
Adverse Health Effects Due to Alterations in Host-Microorganism Interactions D D D I I D
Performance Errors Due to Poor team Cohesion and Performance, Inadequate
Selection/Team Composition, Inadequate Training, and Poor Ps chosocial Adaptation D D D D I D
Accelerated Osteoporosis D D D D D I
Impaired Ability to Maintain Control of Vehicles and Other Complex Systems D D D D I D
Reduced Safety and Efficiency Due to Poor Human Factors Design D D D D I D
Associated with Poor Task Design D D D D I D
Error Due to Inadequate Information D D D D I D
Adverse Health Effects from Lunar Dust Exposure D D I
Performance Errors Due to Sleep Loss, Circadian Desynchronization, Fatigue, and Work
Overload D D D D D D
Bone Fracture D D D D D D
Renal Stone Formation D D D D D D
*NOTE: Scoring is illustrative only and does not represent official NASA Operational Criticality scoring.	 33
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Assessing Criticality —
Question 3
2. Operational Criticality Weighting
Weighting
Lunar Martian
STH	 IMP	 LTH STH	 IMP LTH
Critical 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Important 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Desirable 0.1 1	 0.1 0.11 0.1 1	 0.1 0.1
—	 The OCS,.for each risk is the sum of weights over
each mission type (Lunar and Martian and
consequence type (STH, IMP, and LT	 ).
— For example, the OCS of the risk
an ill or inured crew member is 1
10 + 0.1 = 22.2
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Assessing Criticality —'n,vot'Y" 	
Question 3
• The OCS allows risks to be rank ordered
based on:
—Their relative importance to the missions (Lunar
or Martian)
—Their level of imposed safety and technical risk
(STH, IMP, LTH).
— NOTE: Arithmetic operations on the OCS (e.g.,
addition, multiplication) to calculate quantities
such as averages are not meaningful.
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	 Summary —Section 1
• Qualitative assessment approach provides useful risk
management information.
• Risk manager can:
— view a "snapshot" assessment of the entire portfolio of
risks and
— use OCS Chart as a touch-stone in guiding the allocation
of resources for the management safety and technical
risks.
• The OCS alone cannot dictate funding priorities.
— The cost per unit risk reduction and the timeframe in which
the risk must be addressed are among the other factors
that must be considered for funding priorities.
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Section 2
PLANNED USE OF QUANTITATIVE
RISK ASSESSMENT TOWARDS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK
MITIGATION STRATEGIES
39
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	 Objective
Provide guidance to customers in utilizing
quantitative risk assessment for
development of risk mitigation strategies.
40
v	 Assessment Context
Section 1 allowed us to help risk
managers develop the "investment policy"
regarding a portfolio of risks.
— "Investment policy" based on LxC mapping
and Operational Criticality.
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Assessment Context
• However, LxC mapping is based on the
conditional probability of aworst-case/level 5
consequence and is independent of a risk's
inherent probability of occurrence.
• We also seek to determine the inherent probability
of occurrence of the adverse event(s) stated in
each risk topic's risk statement.
• This information will assist discipline area
researchers with the development of risk
mitigation strategies.
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	 Assessment Guidance
•	 Managers should identify the level of risk it is willing to tolerate for
the probability of occurrence of each risk topic.
• For example-
- The probability of traumatic bone fracture shall not exceed 1 E-1 at the
95th percentile for any given mission.
— The number disrhythmias shall not exceed 2 at the 95 th percentile for
any given mission.
— The prevalence of human factors driven human error shall not exceed 1
in 30 at the 95 th percentile for any given mission.
• The statement describing the level of risk tolerance is often called a
Performance Measure (PM).
— (often these PMs are set as program/project/design requirements)
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v	 Assessment Guidance
The probability of occurrence per mission
of each risk topic should be determined in
order to identify how the risk topic stands
relative to its PM.
If the probability of occurrence of the risk
topic is beyond its PM, researchers should
develop mitigation strategies in an effort to
achieve the PM requirement.
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Section 2 Case Study
NOTIONAL QUANTITATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF RENAL STONE
RISK
45
v	 Risk Statement
0 "Given changes in urinary biochemistry
during space flight, there is a possibility
that symptomatic renal stones may form,
resulting in urinary calculi or urolithiasis,
renal colic (pain), nausea, vomiting,
hematuria, infection, and hydronephrosis."
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4 Wk. Motivations for Simulation
• Traditional PRA approaches represent systems
statically or at best quasi-dynamically even though
many systems are continually evolving temporally.
• The state of human physiological systems change with
time.
• In order to represent human systems using traditional
PRA methods, we would need to string multiple
models together.
• This cascade of mutliple models pushes beyond the
reasonable limits of current RAIT labor resources and
computing power.
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	 Simulation Model
Scope Limitation
—Assessment identifies an astronaut's
propensity to form clinically relevant renal
stones, rather than focusing on symptomatic
renal stones.
— Definition: a clinically relevant stone is one
that grows to a size such that it blocks fluid
flow in any section of the renal system.
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	 Simulation Model
Temporal Constraint: 1000 day mission
— Captures a time frame similar to NASA's
longest planned mission to date (Martian
transit and return).
• Likely to provide aworst-case scenario estimate of
the risk since at this point RAIT assumes the
longer the exposure to spaceflight conditions, the
higher the likelihood of stone formation.
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Simulation Model
• Assessment Metric
— The probability that a clinically relevant renal
stone exists during a 1000 day space mission.
50
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	 Simulation Model
Groundrule:
—There are three main contributors to the
formation of clinically relevant stones:
1. Supersaturation of calcium in the renal system
2. Presence of a nidus size (2 — 3 micon radius)
uric acid crystal
3. Growth rate of a nidus while transiting through
the renal system
51
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	 Simulation Model
• Key Features:
—Once calcium supersaturation is reached, a
generic countermeasure is applied.
—The countermeasure reduces calcium
concentration by 50% over 10 days.
—The model is sensitive to whether an
astronaut is a 9 stone-former".
52
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Simulation Milestone
— If nidii reach clinically relevant size while
travelling the length of the renal system, the
model records the event as well as the
number of times the event occurred.
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R. v Preliminary Results
Probability of Clinically Relevant Stone at 1000 Days
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Value of "0" on this axis indicates the Clinical ITata Statu-- Value of "1" on this axis indicates the
logical response of "false" for clinically — logical response of "true" for clinically
relevant stone formation. relevant stone formation. At 1000 days
it's mean probability level is 0,25,
•	 By day 1000 of a mission, the mean probability that an astronaut will
experience a clinically relevant renal stone is 0.25.
—	 Ninety percent of the estimates for this probability value (i.e. the 5th to 95th
percentile confidence interval) fall between the values of 0.18 and 0.32. 54
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Time History of Clinically Relevant Stone
Clinical_Tctal_Status	 1000
Days
1).LE•
37 Days
0 . 1 C
0.0.E
1}. O 0
l]F	 2.Ce0	 4.aeO7	 6.0eC	 B.OeO7	 1.0eOa
116 days	 463 days
	
694 days	 926 days
Time (s)
15% probability of clinically relevant stone by about day 37. Probability
steadily increases to 25% by day 1000.
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Development of
- 14V Mitigation Strategies
• Assumed PM:
— "Probability of clinically relevant stone shall not exceed
20% at any time during a 1 000 day mission. "
• Example Mitigation Options:
— Develop better screening in order to only approve "non-
stone formers" for flight.
— Increase countermeasure effectiveness by.
• Improving reduction in calcium concentration
• Decreasing time delay for countermeasure to affect change
— Change tolerance to risk by changing PM requirement.
56
v	 Summary —Section 2
• Quantitative assessment approach provides
useful risk mitigation information.
• Researchers and risk managers can:
— Utilize quantification results in developing multiple
strategies to achieving risk tolerance goals
• NOTE: it is vital to define PMs/requirements
in order to capture tolerance for each risk
being assessed.
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v	 Summary —Overall
• Impact at management level
— Qualitative assessment of risk criticality in
conjunction with risk consequence, likelihood,
and severity enable development of an
"investment policy" towards managing a portfolio
of risks.
• Impact at research level
— Quantitative risk assessments enable
researchers to develop risk mitigation strategies
with meaningful risk reduction results.
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